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COMMENTS
"Traditio" In The Civil Law*
Traditio in the Romcan Law
Roman law recognized two different modes of acquiring
property -original and derivative. An original acquisition was
one which applied to things which had never been owned or to
things which had been abandoned, res nullius. A derivative
acquisition arose when a person entered into the right of property which had pre-existed in another. The derivative modes of
conveyance fell into two groups which can be distinguished from
each other by their origin. One group grew out of the civil law
while the other developed from the Jus Gentium. 1
Traditio (delivery) is regarded as a means of conveyance of
the Jus Gentium, 2 but it did have a place, a restricted one, in the
oldest Roman law. The oldest civil method of conveyance was in
lure cessio. This was a formal mode of conveyance which could
be applied to all kinds of property. It consisted of a fictitious
real action or vindication in which the parties appeared in public
before a magistrate of the Roman people. The plaintiff, alienee,
would make a claim upon the defendant, alienor; and the alienor
admitted the claim. The magistrate would then declare that the
*This Comment is based in part upon a paper submitted by the author while
in residence at the University of Edinburgh.
1. Originally the only Roman law was the civil law, or the law which applied to all Romans but only to Romans. As Rome expanded, a need was felt
for a law which could be applied to the unprivileged alien residents of the expanding Empire. These conquered people, it was felt, were outside the pale of
the civil law, but the Romans felt that some law should apply to them. The solution the Romans developed was a secondary or subsidiary civil law which they
applied to all aliens. This law came to be known as the Jus Gentium or the
law of the world. At first these two bodies of law, the civil law and the Jus
Gentium, were completely separate, but as both developed they began to merge.
An example of this is traditio. At first this method of conveyancing was applied
to aliens alone. Later certain elements of traditio were introduced into the civil
law; and, by the time of Justinian, it had so merged into the civil law that he
codified the principle and just mentions the fact that it came from the Jus
Gentium. Some authors look upon the Jus Gentium in much the same light as
they look upon English equity. As Roman civil law principles become solidified,
the courts would often look to and adopt rules of the Jus Gentium which were
often less rigid. By this process the two systems became, to a great extent,
merged; and, by the time Justinian codified the law, the distinction was only
useful in determining the origin of the rules which were expressed in the code.
2. INSTITUTES 2.1.40.
[418)
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property belonged to the alienee, and thus the transfer was completed.8

To relieve the magistrate and the parties from this formal
process a new mode of conveyance, mancipation,4 was introduced. Mancipation did not require the aid of a public official,

but it was confined to property that could be classed as res
mancipi.5 By the time of Gaius 6 mancipatio was the preferred
of these two methods of conveyance because it could be accomplished in private without the aid of a magistrate. 7 The introduction of mancipation rendered mancipable things the more
easily alienable since they could be alienated in private or by
surrender in court while non-mancipable things could only be
conveyed by in lure cessio.
Traditio was introduced at a time when mancipation and in
jure cessio were already established methods of conveyance.
Traditiowas a means of conveyancing by simple delivery of possession; however, when first developed it was available only for
the transfer of res nec mancipi.8 At this time only one kind of
ownership, dominium ex lure Quiritium, was recognized in Roman law.9 If a Roman citizen acquired property properly trans3. GAIs 2.24.
4. Not much is known about the actual procedure used to convey title by
mancipation; however, Gaius did give the following description: "Mancipation is
a fictitious sale, a process peculiar to Roman citizens. It is effected thus: "There are brought together not less than five witnesses. Roman citizens
above the age of puberty and another person similarly qualified, who is to hold
a bronze balance, and is called the libripens. Then the person who is acquiring
by mancipation, taking hold of the thing to be transferred uses the following
form of words: - 'This man (the sale of a slave was usually taken as a typical
example) I declare to be mine by quiritary right, and be he bought to me with
this bronze and bronze balance': then he strikes the balance with a piece of
bronze and gives it to the transferor by way of price." GAMus 1.119.
5. The term res mancipi included land and houses in Italy and in certain
privileged districts outside of Italy, rustic servitudes over such land, slaves, and
beasts of draft and burden. GAius 2.14a; ULP. XIX, 1. A distinction was made
between mancipable movables and immovables. Movable res mancipi could only
be transferred in the presence of the parties; immovables res mancipi did not
need to be in the presence of the parties. See ULP. XIX, 4.5.
6. It has not been determined exactly when Gaius lived, but his commentaries were written some time during the second century A.D.
7. Gains said, "Why should a result that 'can be accomplished in private
with the assistance of our friends be prosecuted with greater trouble in the court
of the praetor or president of the province?" GAIus 2.25.
8. See note 5 supra. Res nee mancipi includes all property which is not included in the term res mancipi. During this period non-mancipable things were
more easily transferrable. The term mancipable, which had before denoted an
enlargement of the power of alienation, then denoted a restriction; mancipable
things were things alienable either by surrender in court or by what was by then
considered the cumbrous process of mancipation. GAius 2.17;2.20. Non-mancipable things could at this time be transferred by surrender in court or by the
very simple process of delivery.
9. GAius 2.40. Since our concern is with Roman law we may assume the

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXII

ferred by mancipation, in lure cessio, or tradition, 10 his ownership was dominium ex lure Quiritium, and he could assert his
title against anyone by an action of vindication." After the introduction of traditio, however, ownership parted into two dif12
ferent kinds, namely, ex lure Quiritiumand bonitary dominion.
The transfer of a mancipable thing by delivery did not give the
transferee title ex lure Quiritium. The effect of such a delivery
was to make the mancipable thing the transferee's in bonis; the
title ex lure Quiritiumremained in the transferor until a period
of prescription had run in the transferee's favor. s This period
having elapsed, the mancipable thing was his by absolute right,
that is, the transferee would then hold in bonis and ex lure Quiritium just as if the res mancipi had been transferred by manci4
pation or by lure in cessio.'
At this point in the development of the law all things could
be conveyed by delivery, but if a mancipable thing were so conveyed the defective title of the transferee had to be cured by
prescription. After this period of prescription had elapsed, the
transferee was entitled to all the remedies provided by Roman
law for owners ex lure Quiritium.15 Until the prescriptive period
had run, however, the transferor held ex lure Quiritium and
under the civil law could assert a claim to the property to which
the transferee had no defense.' 6 Under such conditions the praetor came to the transferee's aid by giving him the exceptio res
venditae et traditae" which in effect denied the transferor's
parties to the transaction to be Roman citizens and the subject of the transaction to admit to Roman ownership. These rules did not apply to aliens, for
dominium was an institution of strict civil law, and so it was not opened to
aliens; nor did they apply to provincial lands, for they in theory belonged to the
Emperor or the Roman people as a whole. GAius 2.7. See also note 1 supra.
10. If the property to be transferred were a re8 mancipi, the transfer had to
be by mancipation or in jure cessio in order for the transferee to take title ex
jure Quiritium; if the property were a res nec mancipi the transfer by tradition
or surrender in court would give the transferee title by ex jure Quiritium.
GAIus 2.40.
11. GAIUS 4.41, 51.
12. GAIus 2.40. Ownership ex jure Quiritium was the only ownership recognized by the civil law. Bonitary dominion was a type of ownership recognized
by the praetorian law. See note 17 infra.
13. GAius 2.41. This period of prescription was termed usucapio in the Roman
law.
14. GMus 2.41.
15. GAzus 4.36.
16. GAIUS 2.41.
17. The praetor had complete control over the procedure in his court. This
is said to be one aspect of the imperium or residuary sovereignty vested in the
higher magistrates of the Roman people. Since the administration of justice was
placed in his hands it was within his competence to give or refuse an action.
When the praetor allowed this exception, which they usually did as a matter
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civil right to assert his claim. 1 8 According to the Jus Civile, the
transferee was in the same position with regard to adverse
claims of third parties. He was not the owner; therefore, he
could not assert ownership against adverse claims. 19 Again the
praetor came to the alienee's aid, this time by the Actio Publiciana20 which allowed a party to recover property as owner before his ownership had been perfected by the lapse of time required according to the rules of prescription. Gaius stated that
he could not claim the thing ex jure Quiritium in his intentio ;21
but by a fiction he was held to have acquired the thing by usucapio, and he could thus put forward his intentio as quasi-owner
ex lure Quiritium.22 By the time of Gaius 23 the complete aliena-

tion of almost all things was possible by delivery, and in the case
of res macncipi the alienee acquired, for nearly all purposes, all
the rights of ownership. The only effective limitation imposed
upon him was that he could not re-convey to another by mancipatio or in jure cessio, for these were civil means of conveyancing and, until prescription had run, he was not owner Jus
24
Civile.
of course, he did not repeal the civil law but did check its effect. This praetorian
law is very much like English equity.
18. DIaEST 21.3 ;44.4.4.31a ;21.3.3.
19. GAIus 4.36.
20. When a praetor entered into office he issued an edict in which he stated
the rules of procedure by which he intended to be governed during his term of
office. He would adopt, in the main, the edict of his predecessor only modifying
or enlarging it as seemed desirable. It is said that the Actio Publiciana was first
put forth in the edict of the PraetorPubliciu8 from whence it got its name. The
edicts of the praetors were a source of praetorian law until Hadrian consolidated
the edicts in 130 A.D. He gave the edicts permanent form, and from that time
they ceased to be a source of praetorian law.
21. All petitions had to follow a certain formula which was composed of,
among other things, an intentio and condemnatio. The intentio is the part of the
formula in which the plaintiff embodies his claim; the condemnatio is the part
of the formula by which the judge receives authority to condemn or absolve the
defendant. A typical example of this formula is given by GAIus 4.41, 51. ". . . if
it appears that the Cornelian estate, now in question, belongs to Aulus Agerius
by Quiritary title, and the said land shall not to your satisfaction be restored
to Aulus Agerius, at what sum soever the amount shall be assessed, in so much
money, judge, condemn Numerius Negidius to Aulus Agerius: if it does not
appear, absolve."
22. GAIus 4.36.

23. See note 6 supra.
24. GAIUS 4.37. Since traditio could not accomplish almost all the purposes
of mancipation, it might be asked why the cumbrous form of mancipatio survived.
There were two reasons for its continued existence. In order for delivery to be
effective as a means of conveyance, the property had to be in the presence of
the parties. This was not required to mancipate movables. See note 5 supra..
Thus it was frequently more convenient to transfer immovables by mancipation.
In the case of slaves a different reason for the continued use of mancipatio
existed. If the master had title to the slave ex jure Quiritium he could free the
slave by manumission, and such a freed slave would become a Roman citizen. If
the master had only bonitary dominion, however, he could not free him in such
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Such was the law in the time of Gaius.2 5 All corporeal things,
movable or immovable, could be acquired by simple delivery;
res mancipi could be so acquired, but until prescription had
elapsed, the title was not perfected. Between the time of Gaius
and Justinian, mancipatio and in jure cessio fell into disuse. 20
This trend was furthered by Justinian's legislation which made
tradition more readily available. He abolished the distinction between res mancipi and res nec mancipi and provided that all
kinds of property could be transferred, in full ownership, by
delivery. 27 This made the distinction between bonitary ownership and dominion ex lure Quiritium unnecessary and consepassed legislation making all ownership ex
quently Justinian
28
jure Quiritium.
In Justinian's time, as was the case before his legislation,
simple delivery was not enough to transfer title. There were
essential conditions which had to be met before title vested in
the transferee. In the opinion of the Roman jurists (a view
which Justinian adopted), only corporeal things were susceptible
of possession and delivery; incorporeal things admitted to
neither possession nor to delivery.29 Thus it was that only a corporeal thing, movable or immovable, could be transferred by delivery. The second essential condition for transferring ownership by delivery was that both transferee and transferor must
be competent to give and acquire ownership by way of tradition.
In general, this meant that the parties must have capacity to
enter into the types of agreement upon which the transaction
30
was founded and that the transferor was the owner of the res.
a way as to make the slave a Roman citizen. Such a freed slave was said to be a
Latin, which denoted a status just below citizenship. This status implied the
jus commeroii (the right of making civil law contracts) but not the jus conubii
(the right of contracting a civil law marriage). GAIUs 1.17, 33-35.
25. See note 6 supra.
26. In the later period of the Empire slavery became uneconomical; thus,
one of the reasons for the continued use of mancipation was not as important.
The only other reason for its continued use was to transfer immovabIes which
were not in the presence of the parties. See note 24 supra. After the introduction
of fictitious delivery, a point covered later in this article, this reason for the
continued use of mancipation was no longer important.
27. INSTITUTES 2.1.40.
28. CODE 7.25.1. Justinian also provided that provincial land might be alienated
by delivery. INSTITUTES 2.1.40. This, combined with the Constitutio Antorniniana
of A.D. 212, which extended Roman citizenship to the whole Roman world, made
the distinction between alien and Roman, provincial and Roman land no longer
necessary. See note 9 supra. For all practical purposes traditio was then universal.
29. DIoEST 41.1.43,1; INSTITUTES 2.1.40.
30. DIGEST 41.1.20. The transferor could not give more than he had and
hence the transferee took the re8 subject to any burdens attached to it. There
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Besides requiring that the res be susceptible of delivery and
that the parties be capable of conveying ownership, Roman law
required that the transferor intend to convey ownership and
the transferee to receive it. It was not necessary, however, to
have what is known in Anglo-American law as consideration or
a quid pro quo. An intention to convey and receive ownership
was all that was required in this regard, and this intent was
inferred from the fact that the parties had come to an agreement.3 ' The essential element here was the intent to transfer
ownership. If the requisite intent (to transfer ownership)
existed in the minds of the parties, it made no difference why
they so intended. Thus, if the parties mistakenly thought there
was an obligation to deliver when in fact there was not, the
property would nevertheless pass. 3 2 Similarly if one party, believed the transaction was a sale while the other thought it a
gift, title would pass, since both parties contemplated a transfer
of ownership.3 3 The case, however, would be different if only
one party contemplated a transfer of title; if the transferor
intended a gift while the transferee intended a loan for use, title
34
would not pass.
In addition to the requirement that the res had to be a corporeal, there had to be some transfer of possession.35 In essence
this requirement meant that the transferor must place the transferee in a position in which he could deal with the res to the exclusion of others. This might be accomplished by an actual
transfer of physical possession, in which case the transfer was
said to be a real tradition. In addition, four types of fictitious
tradition, in which there was no actual physical transfer, were
were, however, a few cases in which non-owners could make a transfer. Within
narrow limits Roman law recognized some principles of agency and in these
cases the agent could transfer title by delivery. INSTITUTES 2.1.42, 43. Then too,
a tutor in some circumstances could alienate the property of his ward. DIGEST
27.9.1; CODE 5.37.22. On the other hand, there were a few instances in which
an owner was not competent to alienate, for example, a husband, though technically owner, could not alienate dotal immovables, and since gifts between husband
and wife were prohibited, delivery by way of gift between spouses was ineffectual
to convey property. DIGEST 24.1.19, 1.
31. INSTITUTES 2.1.40. The essential thing was the intent-animus transferendi et acquirendi dominji. The causa was only important as evidence of the
intent.

See BUCKLAND, TEXT-BooK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS

TO JUs-

TINIAN (2d ed. 1932).
32. DIGEST 41.1.33. In such a case the transferor's action to recover the
property was a condictio indebiti, a personal action based upon the transferee's
quasi-contractual liability. GMUs 3.91; INSTITUTES 3.27. See also DIGEST 22.6.9;
22.6.10; 22.6.65.
33. DIGEST 41.1.36; 12.1.8.
34. Ibid.
35. INSTITUTES 2.1.40; 2.1.41.
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available. Thus, delivery could be effected by placing the res in
view of the transferee and declaring that he might take possession. This was called traditio longa manu. 36 Delivery traditio
longa manu could also be accomplished by placing the object to
be transferred in the house of the transferee. In this case it was
not necessary that the owner of the house, or for that matter
anyone on his behalf, actually see the object at the time of delivery. If the transferee was already in possession of the property
at the time the transferor expressed his intention to convey ownership, the tradition was complete without the necessity of a
transfer and retransfer. Such a transfer was known as traditio
brevi manu." 7 If the transferor wished to transfer ownership of
the property and yet retain its use he might do so by traditio
8
In such a situation the transfer of
consitutum possessorium3
ownership was accomplished without a physical transfer of possession; the transferee became owner, and the transferor remained in possession. The fourth type of fictitious tradition,
symbolical, was based on delivery to the transferee of some object symbolic of ownership and control of the property transferred.39 Thus, if the keys to a warehouse were given to the
transferee, this act constituted sufficient delivery to make the
transferee owner of the contents of the building or owner of the
building and contents, depending on the intention of the
40
parties.
The rules discussed above were true in general for all types
of agreements which had as their purpose the transfer of ownership. However, there were some special rules pertaining to
sales. Under the law of the XII Tables, the agreement to buy
and sell and the physical transfer of the res were not enough
to pass title. According to the construction put upon sale by
the Roman law, the seller was understood not to intend to part
with his property until he had received his money or unless he
36. DIGEST 46.3.79; 41.2.1.
37. DIGEST 12.1.9. For example, A might be in possession of B's goods by way
of deposit. Later, if B wanted to make a gift of the goods to A, he could so
express his intention. If A had the necessary intent, the intent to accept the
liberality, he, A, would become owner without a transfer and retransfer.
38. DIGEST 6.1.77; 41.2.18.
39. INSTITUTES 2.1.45.
40. Akin to this method of symbolical tradition is the process of putting marks
on the res, as upon logs of wood. If, however, the purpose of giving the keys or
marking the logs was not to transfer ownership but was for some other purpose,
such as to allow inspection of the building or to identify the logs, ownership
would not pass because the necessary intention on the part of the presumed transferor would be lacking.
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had received some other satisfaction such as a personal or real
security for the debt. 41 If, before receiving the price or accepting something in lieu of it, he delivered the object, he was understood to have done so without the intention of transferring
ownership. If the vendor sold the goods relying on the credit
of the vendee, however, title would pass. In such a case the
seller was regarded as parting with ownership in confidence
that the buyer would pay the price. 42 Another oddity about the
law of sale was that though title did not pass until sometime
after the agreement to sell, once title did pass, it was given a
retroactive effect. The buyer was then considered as having
owned the property from the date of sale, i.e., the point of time
at which there was consent as to the thing and price.4
Such was traditio in the civil law at the time of Justinian.
Simple delivery of a corporeal coupled with the intent to convey
was all that was needed to transfer title between parties having
the requisite capacity. In the case of sale, the only exception,
the law established that the parties did not intend to convey
ownership until the price was paid. A written document was not
sufficient or necessary to transfer ownership, though such documents were commonly made as a record of the facts. 44 The question now arises, does this Roman principle of traditio exist in
civilian systems today?
Traditio in Selected Civil Law Systems
It would be beyond the scope of this article to consider the
part that traditio has played in all civil law systems, but it is
interesting to note its effect on a few chosen systems. 45 As could
be expected, the Roman-Dutch law followed the Roman prece46
dent.
41. INSTITUTES 2.1.41.
42. Ibid. According to Justinian, the XII Tables provided that if the vendor
sold the goods relying on the credit of the vendee, the title would pass. Controversy still exists as to the origin of this rule. Justinian attributed it to the
XII Tables; some modern writers think that Justinian himself was the source
of the rule. Regardless of its origin, if the goods were sold on credit, the seller
was regarded as parting with the ownership in confidence that the buyer would
pay him. The intention to part with ownership in the case of sale was held not
to attach to the fact of agreement, but to the fact of payment or something in
lieu thereof; and hence, sale did not impute the intention to transfer ownership
unless coupled with payment. In all other cases the transfer of ownership coincided with the delivery of possession providing there was the proper intent.
43. CODE 4.48.1; DIGEST 18.6.8.
44. CODE 3.32.27.
45. In order to keep the article within bounds, compliance with essential elements, such as capacity of the parties, consent, and subject matter will be
assumed.
46. The Roman-Dutch law is used to mean the system which obtained in the
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Corporeal movables could be transferred by delivery provided the other requisites for a transfer were present, 47 and
any of the fictitious methods previously mentioned were sufficient to. constitute a delivery. 4 With respect to immovables,
however, delivery was not sufficient. In many parts of Holland
it early became the practice to convey land before the courts
of the district in which the land was situated. This practice was
made general and obligatory by a Placaat of Charles V of May
10, 1529, which provided that immovables could not be alienated
or encumbered except in the presence of a judge for the place
where the property was situated. A later Political Ordinance
of April 1, 1580, required registration in a land-book. Both of
these enactments provided that the transactions would be null
and void unless their conditions were complied with. It was held,
however, by the courts of Holland that the transactions were
valid and binding as between the parties even though not registered; nevertheless, in order to affect third parties, the transaction had to be passed before the court and registered.4 9 The
courts never resolved the question as to whether title to the
property passed as between the parties if this transaction were
not registered. There seems to be conflict between some writers
as to the exact effect of non-registration on the passing of title
as between the parties; however, Voet said that as between the
parties property passes. 50 If this be true, as between the parties
the law was the same as the earlier Roman law if in fact there
had been an actual or fictitious putting into possession.
South Africa, at one time a Dutch colony, was considerably
influenced by the Roman-Dutch precedents. Corporeal movables
can be transferred by delivery in the same way as this might
be accomplished under the Roman and Roman-Dutch law. South
Africa, however, has extended the methods of fictitious delivery
by allowing a transfer by attornment. 51 Delivery can take place
province of Holland from the middle of the fifteenth to the early years of the
nineteenth century when Napoleon imposed his code on this province. This system
derived from two sources, Germanic Custom and Roman law.
47. The transferor must be the owner of the res or at least be authorized to
transfer it. VAN LEEUWEN 2.7.5; VOET 41.1.35. The transferor and transferee
had to have the proper intention.

LEE, INTRODUCTION To ROMAN-DUTcH

LAW

138-39 (5th ed. 1953). The parties had to be legally competent, and the rea
had to be capable of delivery - a corporeal thing. VOET 41.1.34.
48. LEE, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 136, 137 (5th ed. 1953).
49. Id. at 139, 140.
50. VOET 41.1.42.
51. Garavelli and Figli v. Gollach and Gomperts (Pty.), Ltd., 1 So. Afr.
L.R. 816 (1959) ; Ambassador Factors Corp. v. K. Koppe & Co., 1 So. Afr. L.R.
312 (1949) ; Standard Bank of South Africa, Ltd. v. Efroiken and Newman, So.
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upon an agreement between the transferor, the transferee, and
a third party then holding the property that henceforth the
third party's possession shall be on behalf of the transferee
rather than the transferor. 52 With respect to the sale of movables South Africa follows the Roman and Roman-Dutch rule
that title does not pass until the price has been paid or security
53
or credit given.
Thus far consideration has been given to transfer in general
with no distinction having been made between corporeal movables and immovables. As indicated previously the Roman law
made no distinction, but in the Roman-Dutch law it was otherwise. It is not necessary to trace the numerous registration
statutes which have been in force in South Africa; it is sufficient to mention that in South Africa today a department
called the Deeds Registry exists, and this department exercises
the functions which were previously vested in the courts of
54
Holland.
Thus in South Africa delivery is not the requisite element
for passing title to corporeal immovables; the requisite is rather
registration. It has been heretofore noted that the enactments
in Holland provided that the transactions were invalid, but the
courts held that they were valid as between the parties; in addition, Voet said that as between the parties, property passed
without registration.55 The South African Court has declared
that without registration the transaction is valid as between the
parties, but it has repudiated the utterance of Voet and held
that, even as between the parties, title does not pass. 5 Therefore, in South Africa in order to convey corporeal immovables
there need not be a delivery but rather registration.
Since the reception of Roman legal concepts came later in
Scotland than in other Western European countries, the principle of traditio has not had as great a role there as in some
other civilian systems. The law of Scotland concerning the
transmission of title varies according to the type of property
Afr. L.R. 171 (1924); Goldinger's Trustee v. Whitelaw and Son, So. Afr. L.R.
66 (1917) ; Groenewald v. Van Der Merwe, So. Afr. L.R. 233 (1917) ; Marcus
v. Stamper and Zoutendyk, So. Afr. L.R. 58 (1910).
52. Hearn and Co. (Pty.), Ltd. v. Bleiman, 3 So. Afr. L.R. 617 (1950).
53. Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom), Ltd. v. Douglas, 3 So. Afr. L.R. 420;
73 S.A.L.J. 365 (1956).
54. Deed Registries Act, Acts 1937, No. 47.
55. VOET 41.1.42.
56. Breytenbach v. Van Wijk, So. Afr. L.R. 541 (1923).
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concerned. With respect to corporeal movables, the common law
of Scotland is Roman in character. Here again, the owner of
corporeal movables may convey them by delivery provided he
intends to do so. 7 The rule traditionibus non nudis pactis
transferuntur rerum dominia applies to all forms of contracts
for the conveyance of movables, with the exception of the contract of sale.58 In regard to the contract of sale, Scotland has
adopted, by statute, the common law of England. 59 As in the
Roman law, disregarding the statutory exception of the contract of sale, there is no need for the contract to be in writing,
but this is often done in order to prove the intent to transfer
and to have a record of the facts.6 0 The land law of Scotland
as regards tenure and conveyancing is feudal law modified by
successive enactments. 6 ' Roman principles have had little if
any effect on the methods of transferring title to immovable
property due to the fact that the feudal system was established
in Scotland before she received Roman law principles.
Under French law title passes, as between the parties, upon
the completion of the agreement to transfer without the necessity of delivery. This is true with respect to transfers of immovables as well as movables. Thus, this modern system has
dropped one of the Roman elements, delivery, at least as between the parties. This French modification of the Roman
traditio grew out of the practice of French notaries of inserting
in conveyancing contracts clauses which purported to convey
rights in rem at the moment the agreement was reached. Under
such agreements no further act of delivery was necessary to
transfer title to the rights. Later provision for immediate transfer upon an agreement to that effect was incorporated in the
2
Civil Code.
With respect to the rights of third parties the French draw
a distinction between conveyances of movables and immovables.
Under the doctrine of la possession vaut titre (possession equals
title)63 the second of two purchasers of the same movable is
protected if he receives delivery in good faith. Delivery for the
57. ERSKINE 2.1.18.; BELL, PRINCIPLES § 1458 (1829).
58. See note 57 supra. See also 1 SMITH, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 935
(1955).
59. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Viet. c. 71.
60. 1 SMITH, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 935 (1955).
61. Id. at 917. See also BELL, PRINCIPLES § 675 (1829).
62. AMos, INTRODUCTION To FRENCH LAW 101-03 (1932).
63. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2279.
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purposes of this doctrine is not always required to be actual
delivery, constructive delivery sufficing where actual delivery
is not possible. 64 Under the law as it now stands, title to immovable property, as far as third persons are concerned, is
This principle would
controlled by priority of registration.
seem to apply regardless of the good or bad faith of a second
purchaser or mortgagee. Thus the French law has departed
from the principle that delivery is necessary to convey title,
but, in order to guarantee security of transactions, requires
receipt in good faith where movables are involved or prior
registration in the case of immovables where the transferee
seeks to assert his right against a subsequent transferee."
Transfer of Title in Louisiana
It is a basic principle under the Louisiana Civil Code that
property is transferred upon an agreement between the parties
to that effect.67 However, the Code, statute law, and jurisprudence have established certain modifications to this general
theme. Movables may be transferred as between the parties
by a mere agreement to that effect.6 8 But a transfer of movables
has effect against third parties acquiring rights in good faith
from the transferor only if there has been prior delivery to the
transferee.6 9 Thus in a contest between two good faith transferees the one who has received delivery prevails.70 Similarly,
the creditors of the transferor have superior rights to the transferee to whom the movable has not been delivered. 7i Delivery
may be actual or constructive, depending upon the nature of
64. Id. art. 1606; 5 AuBBY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 354 (5th ed.
1893) ; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, PRECIS DE DROIT CIVIL no 512 (3d ed. 1889) ; 14
LAURENT, PRINCIPES no 167 (5th ed. 1893).
65. There were systems of land registration in France before the Revolution.
It is to be noted, however, that the Code does not provide for the registration of
all interest in immovable property. It was not until 1855 that registration of
deeds as a general principle was recognized on French statute books.
66. See AMOs, INTRODUCTION TO.FRENCH LAW 103-06 (1932).
67. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1909, 1920, 1921, 1922 (1870).
68. Ibid.; Nicolopulco v. His Creditors, 37 La. Ann. 472 (Orl. Cir. 1885)
Nanson & Co. v. Matthews, 24 La. Ann. 90 (Orl. Cir. 1872); Note, 30 TUL. L.
REV. 155 (1955).
69. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1922 (1870) ; Nicolopulco v. His Creditors, 37 La.
Ann. 472 (Orl. Cir. 1885) ; Nanson & Co. v. Matthews, 24 La. Ann..90 (Orl. Cir.
1872) ; Note, 30 TUL. L. REV. 155 (1955).
70. See note 69 supra.
71. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1923 (1870).
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the property.7 2 In these regards, Louisiana reaches the same
results as the French.7

The problem of the effect of delivery upon the extent to
which the rights of a transferee depend upon the rights of his
transferor is an interesting one. According to the doctrine of
la possession vaut titre the transferor who acquires a movable
by fraud, not amounting to theft, may transfer a completely
valid title to a good faith transferee if he delivers the prop-

erty.74 This doctrine, however, is not expressed 75 in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, and when it has been urged upon the
courts it has been rejected. 7 In place of this French doctrine
the Louisiana courts have adopted the bona fide purchaser doctrine of the common law when dealing with goods that a transferor obtained by fraud. 77 This doctrine is predicated on title.
Where a transferee acquires title by fraud he acquires a voidable title, the transferor retaining an equitable interest. Under
the doctrine, if the transferee should re-transfer the title, the
second transferee's legal rights will cut off the equitable rights
78
of the original transferor.
72. Id. art. 2247; Meeker, Knox & Co. v. F. W. Vredenburgh & Co., 15 La.
Ann. 438 (1860) ; Rice & Hathaway v. Kendall, Yoe & Co., 10 La. Ann. 15
(1855). But see Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. Cora Planting & Mfg. Co., 137 La.
807, 69 So. 195 (1915).
73. The theory of la possession vaut tlitre is not to be found in the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870, but it is reflected in Articles 1922, 1923, and 2456 of that
Code. When the theory has been urged upon the courts it has been rejected.
Holton v. Hubbard, 49 La. Ann. 715, 22 So. 338 (1897) ; Holloway v. Ingersoll
Co., 133 So. 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931) ; Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 422 (1948).
When applying Articles 1922 and 2456 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 the
courts come to the same conclusion that would be reached if the doctrine of
la possession vaut titre were applied. Nicolopulco v. His Creditors, 37 La. Ann.
472 (1885) ; Nanson & Co. v. Matthews, 24 La. Ann. 90 (1872) ; Note, 30
TUL. L. REV. 155 (1955).
74. For a full discussion of this point see Comment, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589
(1932) ; Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 422 (1949). As the doctrine of la possession vaut
titre is applied here, two essential conditions must be met; namely, the second
transferee must be in good faith and he must receive delivery.
75. See note 73 supra.
76. See note 73 supra.
77. Stamm-Scheele Mfg. Co. v. Fontenot, 171 La. 614, 131 So. 728 (1930)
State v. Hackley, Mume & Joyce, 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909) ; Blanchard
v. Castille, 19 La. 362 (1841) ; Thomas v. Mead, 8 Mart.(N.S.) 341 (La. 1829).
78. The common law rule is based on equity in that the legal rights of the
third party may cut off the equity of the original transferor. Kibler v. Yakima
Finance Corp., 144 Wash. 604, 258 Pac. 490 (1927) ; 3 Pomeroy, EQUITY JuRisPRUDENcE 3, § 735 (Symon's 5th ed. 1941). The doctrine only applies to a bona
fide purchaser who receives delivery. City Nat. Bank v. Nelson, 218 Ala. 90, 117
So. 681 (1928) ; Tillman v. Heller, 78 Tex. 597, 14 S.W. 700 (1890). The purchaser must be bona fide and have no notice of the defect in title. McFadden v.
Evans-Snider-Bull Co., 185 U.S. 505 (1902); Means v. Bank of Randall, 146
U.S. 355 (1892).
The doctrine does not apply when a third party has been
entrusted with the goods in an agency relationship. Baehr v. Clard, 83 Iowa 313,
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The law of Louisiana also differs from that of France with
respect to stolen and lost goods. Under the French law the
owner has three years from the day that the goods were stolen
79
or lost to bring a revendicatory action against their possessor.
If the possessor purchased the property in what an Anglo-

American lawyer could call market overt,8 0 the owner must
reimburse the possessor What it cost him.8 ' After this threeyear period has elapsed, however, the original owner has no
action to recover the goods that had been stolen or lost.8 2 In
Louisiana if a bona fide purchaser purchased stolen or lost
goods at a public auction or from one in the habit of selling
such things and has possessed the thing for three years or more

he can demand the return of the purchase price before returning the goods to the owner.83 After ten years of possession by
49 N.W. 840 (1891) ; Green v. Wachs, 254 N.Y. 437, 173 N.E. 575 (1930);
Know v. Eden Musse American Co., 148 N.Y. 441, 42 N.E. 988 (1896). If a
person obtains property by misrepresenting himself as an agent of another, he
obtains no title and a third party can protect himself only by showing negligence
on the part of the original seller. Peters Box & Lumber Co. v. Lesh, 119 Ind.
98, 20 N.E. 291 (1889) ; Alexander v. Swackhamer, 105 Ind. 81, 4 N.E. 433
(1886) ; Russel Willis, Inc. v. Page, 213 S.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 627 (1948) ; Petty
v. Borg, 106 Utah 524, 150 P.2d 776 (1944). For a discussion of the distinction
made between misrepresentation made inter praesentes and inter absentes, see
Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 421-22 (1948). The doctrine does not apply when the
goods have been stolen. Voss v. Chamberlain, 139 Iowa 569, 117 'N.W. 269
(1908) ; Harvey E. Mack Co. v. Ryan, 80 Mont. 524, 261 Pac. 293 (1927). The
doctrine of market overt has not been accepted in the United States. Commercial
Credit Co. v. Parker, 101 Fla. 928, 132 So. 640 (1931); Thomas v. Prairie
Home Co-Operative Co., 121 Neb. 603, 237 N.W. 673 (1931). This doctrine of
the common law was early received in Louisiana. See note 77 supra; The Louisiana law has also accepted the exceptions of the common law when a party
breaches a trust. Moore v. Lambeth, 5 La. Ann. 66 (1850) ; Campbell v. Nichols,
11 Rob. 16 (La. 1845) ; Russle v. Favier, 18 La. 585 (1841). If a person misrepresents himself as the agent of another, the Louisiana courts have allowed the
seller to recover the property from a third party. Freeport & Tampico Fuel Oil
Corp. v. Lange, 157 La. 217, 102 So. 313 (1924). However, there is dicta to
the effect that if the seller were negligent, the bona fide purchaser would prevail.
Lynn v. Lafitte, 177 So. 83, 84 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937); Holloway v. Ingersoll
Co., 133 So. 819, 821 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931) ; Russell v. Kunemann, 19 La.
Ann. 517 (1867). For a more detailed treatment of the doctrine and its adoption
in Louisiana, see Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 420 (1948).
79. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2279; 14 Huc, COMMENTAIRE DE CODE: CIVIL no
522 (1902).
80. An open or public market. In London every shop in which goods are
exposed publicly to sale is market overt, but only for things which the owner
professes to trade in. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951). This doctrine has
not been adopted in the United States. Commercial Credit Co. v. Parker, 101
Fla. 928, 132 So. 640 (1931) ; Thomas v. Prairie Home Co-Operative Co., 121
Neb. 603, 237 N.W. 673 (1931).
81. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 2279, 2280.

The French Civil Code, does not

use the term market overt, but "bought it at a fair or at a market or at a public
sale, or from a tradesman selling similar goods." Id. art. 2280. This seems to
have the same connotation as market overt.
82. See note 78 supra.
83. Articles 3506 and 3507 are different from their French counterparts,
Articles 2279 and 2280 of the French Civil Code; therefore, the Louisiana courts
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the purchaser, however, the original owner cannot demand the
return of the goods in Louisiana.84
Like the case of movables, it is a basic principle under the
Louisiana Civil Code that immovable property is transferred
upon an agreement between the parties to that effect; but, as
is the case with most modern legal systems, Louisiana handles
its contracts translative of title to immovables differently from
those involving movables5 5 All transfers of immovables must
be in writing,8 6 with the exception that such a transfer is binding on the parties if, after actual delivery, the transferor confesses the transfer under oath.8 7 No specific form or language
is required for the contract, and the courts have been very
liberal and have held as sufficient any writing which complies
with the substantive law."8

In order to establish security of transactions where transfers
of immovables are involved, Louisiana has developed a system
of registry for such transfers. The Code provides that contracts,
have come to different conclusions when applying the articles in the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870. The Louisiana courts have interpreted Articles 3506 and 3507
of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 in pari materia and have read the three-year
prescriptive period into the latter article. Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167
La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1929). The prescriptive period starts with possession in
Louisiana under the provisions of Articles 3506 and 3507 of the Louisiana Code
of 1870. The possessor must be a bona fide purchaser under the provisions of
these articles; however, even the bona fide purchaser is not entitled to be reimbursed for the purhase price until he has possessed for three years. Security
Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45, 120 So. 250 (1928). After three
years of possession, the bona fide possessor may demand the return of the purchase price if he bought the goods at a public auction or from one in the habit
of selling such goods. Security Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45,.
120 So. 250 (1928) ; Port Finance Co., Inc. v. Ber, 45 So.2d 404 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1950).
84. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3509 (1870).

85. Id. arts. 1909 and 1920 make no distinction between the obligation to
deliver movables and immovables except that in the case of immovables the.
agreement must be clothed with the formalities required by law, these formalities
being a writing and, in order to affect third parties, registration.
86. Id. art. 2275. Under the Spanish law, when it prevailed in Louisiana,
such a writing was not required. Gonzales v. Sanchez, 4 Mart.(N.S.) 657 (La.
1826). The rule was changed by La. Civil Code of 1808, 3.6.241.
87. If the transferor denies the contract, his testimony is controlling and it,,
cannot be contradicted in any way. Sherman v. Nehlig, 154 La. 25, 97 So. 270
(1923) ; Bubenstine v. Flies, 146 La. 727, 84 So. 33 (1920) ; Wright-Blodgett
Co. v. Elms, 106 La. 150, 30 So. 311 (1901) ; Haughery v. Lee, 17 La. Ann. 1
(1865) ; Knox v. Thompson, 12 La. Ann. 114 (1857) ; Stocks v. Furguson, 10
La. Ann. 132 (1855) ; Marionneaux v. Edwards, 4 La. Ann. 103 (1849) ; Bauduc
v. Conrey, 10 Rob. 466 (La. 1845).
88. A mere receipt containing the amount paid, name of the purchaser, de-'
scription of the land, and signature of the seller has been held sufficient to constitute the writing which is required by the Code for a sale. Buise v. Mason, 156
La. 201, 100 So. 297 (1924). See also Hitchcock v. Harris, 1 La. 311 (1830)
Richards v. Nolan, 3 Mart.(N.S.) 336 (La. 1825).
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sales, or judgments affecting immovable property are utterly
null and void, except as between the parties, if they are not
recorded.8 9 Recordation is effective as to third persons from
the time the act is deposited in the recorder's office.90 Third
parties take any rights to immovables free from unrecorded
claims. This is true even though the third party may have known
of the unrecorded claims to the property; knowledge is not
equivalent to registry.9 1 There appears to be an exception to
prevents
this rule, however, where the third party fraudulently
92
deed.
his
recording
from
purchaser
prior
the
Despite the above rules a person acquiring rights in immovables is not always safe in relying on the public records
because some rights in immovables are not created by such
"sales, contracts and judgments" as must be recorded. Rights
created by acquisitive prescription are acquired through the
operation of law and will not appear on the records until
acknowledged by a court judgment. For this reason the transferee must investigate the possibility of prescriptive rights in
order to be sure of the title. The question of which, if any, of
the rights created by virtue of Louisiana's community property
and forced heirship laws must be recorded in order to affect
third parties has proved troublesome. It appears settled that
a marriage contract is not such a contract affecting immovables
as must be recorded. If the records show that a woman is single
when in fact she is married and dealing with community property, a transferee will not be protected by the public record. 3
Similarly, even though the records show that a man was single
when he purchased the immovable, his transferee's rights will
be defeated by those of his children who inherited the interest
94
of their mother who died before the sale.
89. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2266

(1870).

Lack of registration will not affect

the rights of the transferor and transferee. Id. arts. 2266, 2442.
90. Id. art. 2264. This provision has been literally interpreted so that the
third party is charged with notice from the time the act is deposited even though
there will be a delay before the act is entered into the conveyance book. Schneidau
v. New Orleans Land Co., 132 La. 264, 61 So. 225 (1913).
91. McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
92. Howard v. Coyle, 163 La. 257, 111 So. 697 (1927). Richardson Oil Co.
v. Herndon, 157 La. 211, 102 So. 310 (1924) established what could be called
another exception to the rule of McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100
(1909) ; however, the Richardson case has been overruled by LA. CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE art. 3751 (1960).
93. Succession of James, 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920). The husband alone
is the head and master of the community during its existence. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 2404 (1870).
94. This would appear to be the result under the cases of Succession of James,
147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920) and Long v. Chailan, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42
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During the community's existence the husband has authority
to deal with its property."' If the community is terminated by
some type of judgment, this authority terminates, but the judgment must be recorded in order to affect third parties. 96 On
the other hand, where the community terminates by virtue of
the death of one of the spouses, no recordation of this fact is
necessary.9 7 Rights of heirship need never be recorded, though
they may be defeated in some cases by the failure to make other
recordations that are necessary. It has been held that a divorced
wife's rights were inferior to those of a third party purchaser
where he relied on the public records, the judgment of divorce
not having been recorded.98 From this it would seem to follow
that the wife's heirs' rights are also inferior to those of the
third party purchaser where a judgment of divorce is not recorded. If the wife had died during the existence of the community, however, the claim of her heirs would not be barred. 99
Conclusions
From the foregoing it can be seen that the idea of a transfer
of title upon delivery still finds a place in modern civil systems.
When dealing with movables, some of these systems follow the
Roman law which ruled the dealings of the Roman people in
the sixth century A.D. These systems still hold that title to
movables can be transferred by a simple transfer of possession.
Some civil systems now provide that title will pass upon agreement, but even these systems require a delivery of movables
before the transferee is given any great degree of protection
fyom claims of third parties. When dealing with immovables,
lowever, the role of traditio has been greatly reduced in all civil
systems due to the need for greater security of transactions
in modern business type societies.
Gordon Pugh
(1947). The public records should show whether the recorded owner is married
or single. LA. R.S. 35:11, 44:135 (1950). If the statement as to the marital
status of the owner is false, the third party is not protected under the rule of
SucCession of James and Long v. Chailan above.
95. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
96. Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So.2d 220 (1949).
97. Long v. Chailan, 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937).
98. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
99. Humphreys v. Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So.2d 220 (1949).

